



The use of logical tools in the investigation of religious discourse can be traced 
back as far as the ancient times, but was particularly common in specific pe-
riods of some religious traditions. Several authors, for example Thomas Aqui-
nas, endeavoured to use in their texts the rigour and precision that the available 
logical tools provided. As heirs of such a tradition, Józef Maria Bocheński, Jan 
Salamucha, Jan Drewnowski, and Bolesław Sobociński formed the so-called Cra-
cow Circle (1934–1944),1 which aimed at employing the most current methods of 
mathematical logic in matters of the philosophy of religion and theology. Their 
ideas and achievements were so important that, according to Roger Pouivet, the 
philosophers of religion of the Cracow Circle are “the principal precursors of 
what is now called the analytic philosophy of religion.”2 According to Bocheński, 
the Cracow Circle postulated that:
1) the language of philosophers and theologians should exhibit the same 
standard of clarity and precision as the language of science;
1 See R. Murawski, Cracow Circle and Its Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, “Axiomathes” 
2015, Vol. 25, pp. 359–376.
2 R. Pouivet, On the Polish Roots of the Analytic Philosophy of Religion, “European Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion” 2011, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 1.
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2) in their scholarly practice they should replace scholastic concepts with new 
notions now applied by logicians, semioticians, and methodologists;
3) they should not shun the occasional use of symbolic language.3
In this sense, philosophical and theological doctrines can benefit greatly from 
employing formalization. This logical approach introduces exactness, clarity, and 
precision in concepts and arguments and makes it possible to eliminate several 
kinds of ambiguities.
Although there have been some initiatives in the second half of the past cen-
tury involving this way of doing philosophy of religion and theology and an in-
creased interest in the study of the relationship between logic and religion, as 
well as in the use of logical tools by analytic philosophers of religion, the goals 
outlined by the Cracow Circle are far from achieved. The construction of for-
malized systems in the philosophy of religion is an approach not as common as 
it could be. The belief that such an enterprise has several advantages in solving 
philosophical problems has propelled the authors of this paper into the investiga-
tion of a famous issue in the philosophy of religion. The approach used here can 
be considered a case of logic of religion, as proposed by Bocheński; particularly, it 
is a case of logic applied to theodicy.4 In what follows, we delineate this problem.
1. Systems N1, N2, and the Logical Problem of Evil
The problem of evil is one of the most prominent issues in the history of phi-
losophy. Though many answers have been provided since ancient times, many 
authors still maintain that it is a challenge to belief in God. One can approach the 
problem in many ways; however, in the contemporary debate, there are at least 
two strands of this problem. Some philosophers have argued that the existence of 
God is very improbable, given the amount and variety of evil in the world; this 
proposal has been called the evidential problem of evil.5 Others claim that the 
propositions “God exists” and “evil exists” are mutually inconsistent, and thus 
theists cannot be rational. John Mackie is one such philosopher; as he says,
3 J.M. Bocheński, The Cracow Circle, in: The Vienna Circle and the Lvov–Warsaw School, ed. K. Sza-
niawski, Dordrecht 1989, pp. 9–18.
4 On the logic of religion, see Bocheński’s seminal work, The Logic of Religion, New York, NY 1965. 
5 For a comprehensive overview on this issue, cf. D. Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument 
from Evil, Indianapolis, IN 1996.
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[A] more telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of 
evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but 
that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theo-
logical doctrine are inconsistent with one another.6
The affirmation that belief in God is contradictory with the existence of evil is 
called the logical problem of evil, and it is our focus here. One of the most influ-
ential responses to Mackie is the free will defence, developed by Alvin Plantinga. 
He develops his defence in modal metaphysics and semantics of possible worlds, 
to consider whether God could have created a world with less moral evil – or even 
no moral evil at all. Plantinga concludes that it is possible that God could not 
have done this; it is possible that He had a reason to permit the existence of evil 
in the world, and, thus, there is no contradiction between the existence of God 
and the existence of evil.7 
Although the free will defence can still be considered relevant nowadays, it 
relies on some assumptions that remain a matter of discussion. Just to provide an 
example, one of its most debatable issues is the property of “transworld deprav-
ity” (TWD), a property needed to show that it is possible that God could have 
had a reason to allow evil in the world. However, as Richard Otte has shown, the 
original version of TWD is necessarily false, and Plantinga himself recognized 
it.8 The current version of the argument relies on the version of TWD given by 
Otte, but one might wonder whether the argument with Otte’s TWD is the de-
finitive version of a free will defence; as there is no way to demonstrate its logical 
possibility, the success of such an account depends on the success of its underly-
ing modal metaphysics, and to the extent that natural language allows concepts 
to be defined with no ambiguity.
Furthermore, even if the free will defence succeeds, other proposals may pro-
vide alternative paths to tackle the question.9 Meanwhile, we could also conceive 
6 J.L. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, “Mind” 1955, Vol. 64 (254), p. 200.
7 A. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, MI 1977, pp. 7–73.
8 R. Otte, Transworld Depravity and Unobtainable Worlds, “Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research” 2009, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 165–177; A. Plantinga, Transworld Depravity, Transworld 
Sanctity, & Uncooperative Essences, “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research” 2009, Vol. 78, 
No. 1, pp. 178–191.
9 There are plenty of proposals: both defences (possible answers that invalidate an objection from 
evil) and theodicies (responses to the question of why God permits evil in the world), and even 
arguments from evil for the existence of God. See J. McBrayer, D. Howard-Snyder, The Blackwell 
Companion to the Problem of Evil, Oxford 2013, for a comprehensive sample of such approaches.
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alternative approaches that have not been explored yet; for instance, instead of just 
using the semantics of possible worlds and modal metaphysics, why not appeal 
to full-blown formal logic? Formal logic improves precision and clarity of argu-
ments, removes ambiguity, brings new results that could not be attained through 
natural language, and even preserves truth in a way that natural languages are 
not able to. Why not refer to such a powerful tool? As the Cracow Circle did, 
concerning many relevant philosophical and religious questions of their days, 
we also do believe that logical questions require logical answers, and the logical 
problem of evil is not different. In what follows, we introduce this proposal.
Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems to deal with the task of 
a formal theodicy.10 His aim is, in principle, to provide an answer to the problem 
of evil, especially in its logical form, but his systems offered a wider framework 
to consider questions related to religious determinism, the attributes of God, and 
formal axiology. One of the merits of his systems is that they characterize the log-
ical problem of evil, a question usually stated in terms of contradiction and con-
sistency, as a matter of logical investigation. Much of the contemporary debate on 
the logical problem of evil is done within a modal metaphysics framework, with 
no explicit formalization,11 and Nieznański’s approaches have the merit of deal-
ing with the question by developing such formal systems.
Nieznański’s systems have philosophical relevance, and, further, his general 
methodology is very inspiring as an application of formal tools to philosophical 
problems. However, some logical issues led us to revisit his systems, proposing 
a  few changes. For instance, consider the following list of formulas, the origi-
nal axioms of his first system.12 In these formulas, β stands for God, x is a vari-
10 E. Nieznański, Aksjomatyczne ujęcie problemu teodycei, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 2007, Vol. 55, 
No. 1, pp. 201–217; E. Nieznański, Elements of Modal Theodicy, “Bulletin of the Section of Logic” 
2008, Vol. 37, No. 3/4, pp. 253–264.
11 Plantinga’s contribution is not only the most influential answer to the logical problem of evil, but 
it also determined the trend of dealing with this subject in the context of metaphysics of modal-
ity and possible worlds semantics. Among the works that follow Plantinga on dealing with the 
problem, but in natural language, are D. Howard-Snyder and J. O’Leary-Hawthorne, Transworld 
Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, “International Journal for Philosophy of Religion” 
1998, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 1–21; W.L. Rowe, In Defense of “The Free Will Defense”: Response to Dan-
iel Howard-Snyder and John O’Leary-Hawthorne, “International Journal for Philosophy of Reli-
gion” 1998, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 115–120; R. Otte, Transworld Depravity…, op. cit.; and A.R. Pruss, 
A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, “Faith and Philosophy” 2012, Vol. 29, No. 4, 
pp. 400–415.
12 E. Nieznański, Aksjomatyczne ujęcie problemu teodycei, op. cit., pp. 203–211.
Formal Theodicy: Religious Determinism…
97
able that stands for persons, p and q are variables that stand for situations, W is 
a symbol for “knows that,” C is a symbol that means “wills that,” D is a symbol 
for “permits that,” p ε d means “the situation p is good,” and, finally, P stands for 
“to be the cause of”: 
A1. ∀x (∃p xWp ∧ ∃q xCq) 
A2. ∀p [βCp → βC(βCp)] 
A3. ∀p [βDp → βC(βDp)] 
A4. ∀p [∃x βC(xCp) → ∀x βD(xDp)] 
A5. ∼∀p (p → p ε d)
A6. ∀p (βPp ↔ βCp)
When we examine these axioms, from the point of view of mainstream log-
ic, some questions naturally arise: what is the underlying logical system? What 
is the precise meaning of the symbol ε? Do the symbols W, C, D and P repre-
sent functions, predicates or modal operators? And, finally, how to justify the 
use of variables in formulas such as those in A5? These questions are surely rel-
evant, but there is not much discussion about the specific logical structure in 
Nieznański’s article. A more robust account is provided in his second system, 
a modal account,13 but some of the questions listed above can also be applied to 
this second approach.
Nevertheless, we maintain that Nieznański’s insights are philosophically 
penetrating,14 and his general methodology of formalizing concepts is inventive 
and very inspiring. For this reason, these issues, among others, led us to work on 
a detailed treatment. Thus, we have proposed two revisited systems, as a revisi- 
ting (or remaking) of Nieznański’s approaches; the first of these systems is N1, 
13 E. Nieznański, Elements of Modal Theodicy, op. cit.
14 It is not possible to summarize all of the relevant insights of Nieznański’s works here. We en-
courage interested readers to acquaint themselves with his works in detail to see how the philo-
sophical concepts that he explores rely upon good intuitions concerning the nature of God, the 
relation between situations, and the relation between will and other features of agents, such as 
coherence and responsibility; see E. Nieznański, Aksjomatyczne ujęcie problemu teodycei, op. cit.; 
E. Nieznański, Elements of Modal Theodicy, op. cit.
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published recently in an article, and the second is N2, to be published soon.15 Of 
course, the line that distinguishes a “revisiting” from a “remaking” is sometimes 
obscure, but our proceeding with both systems can be synthesized as follows: 
first, we re-established the formal language to create one that, according to our 
vision, is more adequate for accomplishing Nieznański’s tasks; we described both 
N1 and N2 as first-order modal systems, with two modal operators: 𝒲θ (“God 
knows”) and 𝒞θ (“God wills”). In our interpretation, these operators are sufficient 
for dealing with some of the main subjects that Nieznański is concerned with in 
his articles. Furthermore, we established the formal language, the rules of infer-
ence, and other features. Then, we defined a new set of axiom schemes, many of 
them inspired by Nieznański’s work, but with a new formulation, to finally prove 
some theorems.
The resulting systems have much of the original basic structure, and many 
axioms, definitions and theorems remain unchanged – yet some new results are 
obtained. In particular, both N1 and N2 characterize the attributes of God, pro-
vide a formal axiology, and give an answer to a form of religious determinism; 
all of these results are also obtained from their distinct sets of axioms. However, 
when considered together, one of the outcomes is surprising: the systems are mu-
tually contradictory. Let us first consider the following formulas:
(1)  ∀p [βDp → βC(βDp)]
(2)  ∼∀p [βDp → βC(βDp)]16
These formulas are axioms of Nieznański’s systems: formula (1) belongs to the 
first one, and (2) belongs to the second. The first-order modal versions of them, 
with the correspondent standard interpretations, are the following:
(1′)  ∀p (𝒟θ α(p) → 𝒞θ 𝒟θ α(p))
(For all situations, if God permits some state of affairs, then God 
wills to permit such state of affairs.)
15 G.B. da Silva, F.M. Bertato, A First-Order Modal Theodicy: God, Evil, and Religious Determinism, 
“South American Journal of Logic” 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 49–80; G.B. da Silva, F.M. Bertato, 
God, Evil, and Religious Determinism: Another First-Order Modal Theodicy, forthcoming.
16 E. Nieznański, Elements of Modal Theodicy, op. cit., p. 259. The formula written here in the nota-
tion of Nieznański’s first system is presented in his second system as axiom A6, which in another 
notation is given by ∼∀p(Dbp → CbDbp).
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(2′)  ¬∀p(𝒟θ α(p) → 𝒞θ 𝒟θ α(p))
 (Not all situations are such that if God permits some state of affairs, 
then God wills to permit such state of affairs.)
As is evident, the axioms are explicitly contradictory: (1) contradicts (2), and 
(1′) contradicts (2′). These contradictions lead us to at least two possible conclu-
sions: either one or both systems are trivial, and thus all of the results could be 
trivially obtained, or, there is a set of axioms which is sufficient to reach some of 
the most interesting conclusions for both systems, avoiding contradictions. 
But the conclusions obtained are not trivial. Indeed, our research finds that 
there is a set of axioms which satisfies the demands of a new axiomatic system, 
similar to N1 and N2. The new system, called N3, is based on both previous sys-
tems, but has only three axioms (much less than N1 or N2, each one with eleven 
axioms). We think that these axioms are sufficient to prove the most relevant re-
sults of N1 and N2, as well as the results Nieznański aimed at: N3 proposes an an-
swer to the problem of evil through the refutation of a version of religious deter-
minism, showing that the attributes of God in classical theism, namely, those of 
omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and omnibenevolence, when adequately 
formalized, are consistent with the existence of evil in the world. On the one 
hand, these questions are also tackled by Nieznański’s systems, but, on the other 
hand, they are obtained in N3 with fewer assumptions.
In the following, we present the formal structure of N3.
2. N3: A Minimal System
2.1. The Language, Rules, and Axioms of N3
The first-order modal language LN3 of N3 is composed of the following symbols 
as primitives:17
(i) Unary predicate symbols: B, P, δ, ξ; 
(ii) A constant symbol (a distinguished element): θ;
17 Concerning first-order modal logic, see G.E. Hughes, M.J. Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal 
Logic, London 1996; W. Carnielli, C. Pizzi, Modalities and Multimodalities, Logic, Epistemology, 
and the Unity of Science 12, Dordrecht 2008; M. Fitting, R.L. Mendelsohn, First-Order Modal Logic, 
Dordrecht 2012. These works have provided useful guidance in the development of this work.
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(iii) Variables for situations: p, q, r, possibly with subscripts;18
(iv)  The symbols for connectives: ¬,  → , ∨,  ∧ , ↔;
(v)  The symbols for operators: ∀, ∃;
(vi) Two symbols for specific modal operators: 𝒞θ, 𝒲θ.19
The definition of a well-formed formula (wff ) is the usual, with the expected 
extensions. The interdefinibility of connectives and operators is also the usual.
The basic rules of deduction of N3 are: Modus Ponens (MP), Uniform Substitu-
tion (US), Rule of Necessitation (Nec) and Substitution of Equivalents (Eq). They 
are stated below:
(MP)  ϕ, ϕ → ψ ⊢N3 ψ.
(US)  The result of uniformly replacing any variable or variables p1, …, pn 
in a theorem by any wff ϕ1, …, ϕn, respectively, is itself a theorem.
(Nec)  If ⊢N3 ϕ, then ⊢N3 𝒲θ ϕ and ⊢N3 𝒞θ ϕ.
(Eq)  If ϕ is a theorem and ψ differs from ϕ in having some wff µ as a sub-
formula in one or more places where ϕ has a wff γ as a subformula, 
then if µ ↔ γ is a theorem, ψ is also a theorem.20
As a convention, in N3, α(p) stands for any wff that involves only the variable p, 
where p is free. Thus, we distinguish in N3 two types of situations, namely, basic 
situations (of the world) and situations involving situations (which are here called 
states of affairs). The variables for situations correspond, therefore, to basic situ-
ations. In turn, formulas that contain occurrences of free variables for situations 
represent states of affairs. We are particularly interested here in a specific type of 
state of affairs, namely, one in which a certain situation p is the case, represented 
by P(p). Thus, formulas in the form α(p) with only one free variable, p, are the 
18 Despite considering variables for situations, a variable can assume the value θ. It is not intuitive 
to say that God is a situation, and therefore we could say that the symbols p, q, and r represent 
either God or situations. N3 deals explicitly only with God and the (possible) situations of the 
world. Thus, in addition to dealing with situations, we can express in N3 sentences such as “God 
is good,” “God is not contingent,” etc.
19 N3 is a type of First-Order Epistemic-Boulomaic Modal Logic. 𝒲θ is an epistemic operator that 
represents knowledge and 𝒞θ is a boulomaic operator that represents will. 
20 This version of Eq is inspired by an equivalent rule formulated in G.E. Hughes, M.J. Cresswell, 
A New Introduction to Modal Logic, op. cit., p. 32.
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most important. However, we could deal with states of affairs involving more 
than one situation, say α(p, q), but this is dispensable for our purposes.
For ease of reading, we establish a  standard interpretation for each wff, ac-
cording to the following semantic in natural language, which can be considered 
as a set of abbreviations:
θ  ≔ “God”;
P(p)  ≔ “p is the case”;
B(θ)  ≔ “θ is divine”;
δ(p)  ≔ “p is good”;
ξ(p)  ≔ “p is evil”;
𝒞θ α(p) ≔ “God wills the state of affairs α(p)”;
𝒲θ α(p) ≔ “God knows the state of affairs α(p).”
In the following, we give an account of some of the divine attributes in order 
to provide a formal treatment of the questions raised in section 1.
2.2. The Attributes of God
We begin by presenting the definition of divinity:
Def. 1. (Divinity). B(θ) :↔ (WW ∧ NM ∧ WM ∧ DB)
 (God is divine iff He is omniscient, infallible, omnipotent, and om-
nibenevolent.)
The following definitions aim at formally expressing some relations that char-
acterize the divine attributes of classical theism according to our approach. They 
are essentially proposed by Nieznański and they have the advantage of their pre-
cision and of a certain correspondence with the traditional concepts in the his-
torical debate.21
Def. 2. WW :↔ ∀p (α(p) → 𝒲θ α(p)) 
 (God is omniscient iff for all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, 
then God knows it.)
21 Cf. E. Nieznański, Aksjomatyczne ujęcie problemu teodycei, op. cit., pp. 204–205; E. Nieznański, 
Elements of Modal Theodicy, op. cit., pp. 255–256.
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Def. 3. NM :↔ ∀p (𝒲θ α(p) → α(p)) 
 (God is infallible iff, for all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, 
then it is the case.)
Def. 4. WM :↔ ∀p (𝒞θ α(p) → α(p)) 
 (God is omnipotent iff, for all situations, if God wills a state of af-
fairs, then it is the case.)
Def. 5. DB :↔ ∀p (𝒞θ P(p) → δ(p))
 (God is omnibenevolent iff, for all situations, if God wills a situation 
to be the case, then such situation is good.)
Thus, the most relevant divine attributes are defined in order to approach the 
problem of evil, namely, omniscience, infallibility, omnipotence, and omnibe-
nevolence.
As we have stated in the last section, N3 is composed of only three axioms. 
These axioms are not difficult to assume in the context of the problem of evil; we 
believe that to some extent they correspond to what Mackie intends to do when 
he proposes the contemporary version of the problem of evil.22
A1.  B(θ)
 (God is divine.)
A2.  ¬∀p (P(p) → δ(p)) 
 (Not all situations are such that, if a situation is the case, then such 
situation is good.)23
A3.  ∀p (δ(p) → ¬ξ(p))
 (For all situations, if a situation is good, then it is not evil.)
22 Mackie states some of the attributes of God, affirms that there is evil, and relates evil situations 
to good ones. Then, he argues for the incompatibility of those concepts. See J.L. Mackie, Evil and 
Omnipotence, op. cit., pp. 200–201.
23 An equivalent formulation of A2 would be ∃p (P(p) ∧ ¬δ(p)), i.e., there is at least one situation 
that is the case but is not good.
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As an immediate consequence of Def. 1 and A1, the validity of the four attri- 
butes considered is established:
T1.  WW ∧ NM ∧ WM ∧ DB 
 (God is omniscient, infallible, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.)
Proof. 
1. B(θ)      [A1]
2. B(θ) :↔ WW ∧ NM ∧ WM ∧ DB  [Def. 1]
3. WW ∧ NM ∧ WM ∧ DB   [PC, 1, 2]24
         ◻
The following theorems are corollaries of T1 and can be easily obtained:
T1.1.  ∀p (α(p) → 𝒲θ α(p))     ◻
 (For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then God knows 
such a state of affairs.)
T1.2.  ∀p (𝒲θ α(p) → α(p))     ◻
 (For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then such state of 
affairs is the case.)
T1.3.  ∀p (𝒞θ α(p) → α(p))      ◻
 (For all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, then such state of 
affairs is the case.)
T1.4.  ∀p (𝒞θ P(p) → δ(p))      ◻
 (For all situations, if God wills some situation to be the case, then 
such situation is good.)
24 We use PC to indicate the use of some theorems or results from the Propositional Calculus.
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Summing up, in all situations, and for arbitrary states of affairs, if a state of 
affairs is the case, then God knows it, for He is omniscient; if God knows a state 
of affairs, then it is the case, for God is infallible in His knowledge; if God wills 
a state of affairs, then it is the case, for he is omnipotent; and, finally, as God is 
omnibenevolent, if he wills a state of affairs, then it is good. 
In this regard, David Hume asks: why is there evil in the world? As he remarks 
in his classical statement on the problem of evil:
Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but 
not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. 
Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?25
Hume seems to assume that if God does not will a state of affairs, then such 
a state of affairs is not the case. But this is equivalent to saying that if a state of 
affairs is the case, then God wills such a state of affairs. Such a statement is the 
reciprocal of the attribute of omnipotence and is not necessarily valid. In fact, we 
will prove that such a hypothesis – which is here called religious determinism, or, 
simply, determinism (DET1) – is not a theorem in N3.
Another version of determinism is more related to God’s omniscience, since 
it supposes that if a state of affairs is the case, then He wills such a state of affairs 
(DET2). Surprisingly, it can be easily proved in N3 that the negation of DET2 is 
derived from the negation of DET1.
In this way, we formally state two deterministic hypotheses, which are refuted 
in N3.
(DET1). ∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))
 (For all situations, if a situation is the case, then God wills such situ-
ation to be the case.)
(DET2). ∀p (𝒲θ P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))
 (For all situations, if God knows a situation to be the case, then God 
wills such situation to be the case.)
Next, we proceed to refute these two versions of religious determinism.
25 D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in: David Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natu-
ral Religion in Focus, ed. S. Tweyman, London 2013 [1779], p. 273.
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2.3. Religious Determinism Defeated
As we have already said, N3 is a minimal system, in the sense of assuming a very 
small number of axioms in comparison to N1 and N2, in order for us to be able 
to propose a solution to the famous logical problem of evil. Therefore, we will 
present some results about the existence of contingent situations and the fact that 
there are states of affairs that are not willed by God, but that are permitted. It can 
be considered that such results show the possibility of an investigation on free 
will. However, this is outside the scope of this article.
That said, we now proceed to formally refute the two versions of determinism.
T2 (¬DET1). ¬∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))
 (Not all situations are such that, if a situation is the case, then God 
wills such situation to be the case.)
Proof. 
1. ¬¬∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))   [Hip]26
2. ∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [PC, 1] 
3. P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p)   [2, Spec]27 
4. 𝒞θ P(p) → δ(p)   [T1.4, Spec]
5. P(p) → δ(p)    [PC, 3, 4]
6. ∀p (P(p) → δ(p))  [Gen, 5]28
7. ¬∀p (P(p) → δ(p))   [A2]
8. ¬¬¬∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [¬Hip, 6, 7]
9. ¬∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [PC, 8]     ◻
T3 (¬DET2). ¬∀p (𝒲θ P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))
 (Not all situations are such that if God knows a situation to be the 
case, then God wills such a situation to be the case.)
26 Hypothesis.
27 Specification Rule.
28 Generalization Rule. 
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Proof. 
1. ∀p (𝒲θ P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [Hip]
2. 𝒲θ P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p)  [1, Spec]
3. P(p) → 𝒲θ P(p)   [T1.1, α(p)/P(p), Spec]
4. 𝒲θ P(p) → P(p)   [T1.2, α(p)/P(p), Spec]
5. P(p) ↔ 𝒲θ P(p)  [PC, 3, 4]
6. P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p)   [Eq, 5 in 2]
7. ∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [Gen, 6]
8. ¬∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [T2]
9. ¬∀p (𝒲θ P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p)) [PC, 9]
         ◻
Thus, we easily refuted the two versions of determinism which are funda- 
mental for the discussion about the logical problem of evil. To solve the question 
of determinism without needing many previous results is a remarkable charac-
teristic of N3.
2.4. Further Consequences: God, Values and Determinism
Given the results of the previous section, we now explore some elementary re-
sults with respect to the problem of evil in itself. We think these theorems and 
definitions are self-explanatory: they, in conjunction, provide a  framework to 
reconsider whether there is compatibility between the existence of evil and the 
existence of God.
T4.  ∀p (ξ(p) → ¬δ(p))
 (For all situations, if a  situation is evil, then such situation is not 
good.)
Proof. Easily deduced from A3, by contraposition.    ◻
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T5.  ∀p (¬δ(p) → ¬𝒞θ P(p))
 (For all situations, if a situation is not good, then it is not the case 
that God wills it to be the case.)
Proof. Easily deduced from T1.4, by contraposition.   ◻
T6.  ∀p (ξ(p) → ¬𝒞θ P(p))
 (For all situations, if a situation is evil, then it is not the case that 
God wills it to be the case.)
Proof. 
1. ξ(p) → ¬δ(p)    [T4, Spec]
2. ¬δ(p) → ¬𝒞θ P(p)   [T5, Spec]
3. ξ(p) → ¬𝒞θ P(p)    [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p (ξ(p) → ¬𝒞θ P(p))   [Gen, 3]
          ◻
T7.  ∀p ¬𝒞θ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))
 (For all situations, it is not the case that God wills some contradic-
tion.)
Proof.
1. 𝒞θ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) → (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))) [T1.3, α(p)/(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)), Spec]
2. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) → ¬𝒞θ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))    [PC-Theorem]
4. ¬𝒞θ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))   [MP, 3, 2]
5. ∀p ¬𝒞θ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))   [Gen, 4]
         ◻
Gesiel Borges da Silva, Fábio Maia Bertato
108
T8.  ∀p 𝒞θ ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))
 (All situations are such that God wills non-contradictions.)
Proof.
1. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))   [PC-Theorem]
2. 𝒞θ ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))  [Nec, 1]
3. ∀p 𝒞θ ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))  [Gen, 2]
        ◻
Permission is defined in N3 as the dual operator of 𝒞θ:
Def. 6 (Permission). 𝒟θ α(p) :↔ ¬𝒞θ¬α(p)
 (God permits a state of affairs iff He does not will the opposite.)
T9.  ∀p (𝒞θ α(p) ↔ ¬𝒟θ¬α(p))
 (For all situations, God wills a state of affairs iff He does not permit 
the opposite.)
Proof. 
1. 𝒟θ ¬α(p) ↔ ¬𝒞θ ¬¬α(p)  [Def. 6, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. 𝒟θ ¬α(p) ↔ ¬𝒞θ α(p)  [PC, 1]
3. 𝒞θ α(p) ↔ ¬𝒟θ¬α(p)  [PC, 2]
4. ∀p (𝒞θ α(p) ↔ ¬𝒟θ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
         ◻
T10.  ∀p (α(p) → 𝒟θ α(p))
 (For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then it is permitted 
by God.)
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Proof. 
1. 𝒞θ ¬α(p) → ¬α(p)  [T1.3, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. 𝒟θ α(p) ↔ ¬𝒞θ¬α(p)  [Def. 6, Spec]
3. α(p) → 𝒟θ α(p)   [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p (α(p) → 𝒟θ α(p))  [Gen, 3] 
        ◻
T11.  ¬∀p (𝒟θ α(p) → α(p))
 (Not all situations are such that, if God permits some state of affairs, 
then it is the case.)
Proof.
  1. ∀p (𝒟θ α(p) → α(p))  [Hip]
  2. 𝒟θ α(p) → α(p)  [Spec, 1]
  3. 𝒟θ α(p) ↔ ¬𝒞θ¬α(p)  [Def. 6, Spec]
  4. ¬𝒞θ¬α(p) → α(p)  [Eq, 3 in 2]
  5. ¬α(p) → 𝒞θ¬α(p)  [PC, 4]
  6. α(p) → 𝒞θ α(p)   [5, α(p)/¬α(p), PC]
  7. P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p)  [6, α(p)/P(p)]
  8. ∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [Gen, 7]
  9. ¬∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [T2]
10. ¬∀p (𝒟θ α(p) → α(p))  [¬Hip, 1]
          ◻
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A contingent state of affairs, according to the philosophical tradition, is one 
such that this state of affairs and its complementary are both possible, or, as we 
define here, permitted by God:
Def. 7. K(p) :↔ (𝒟θ P(p) ∧ 𝒟θ ¬P(p))
 (A situation is contingent iff God permits it to be or not to be the 
case.) 
T12.  ∀p (K(p) ↔ (¬𝒞θ P(p) ∧ ¬𝒞θ¬P(p)))
 (For all situations, a situation is contingent iff neither God wills such 
situation to be the case, nor wills it not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. K(p) ↔ (𝒟θ P(p) ∧ 𝒟θ¬P(p))   [Def. 7]
2. 𝒟θ P(p) ↔ ¬𝒞θ ¬P(p)    [Def. 6, Spec]
3. 𝒞θ P(p) ↔ ¬𝒟θ ¬P(p)    [T9, Spec]
4. 𝒟θ ¬P(p) ↔ ¬𝒞θ P(p)    [PC, 3]
5. K(p) ↔ (¬𝒞θ P(p) ∧ ¬𝒞θ ¬P(p))   [Eq, 2 ∧ 4 in 1, PC]
6. ∀p (K(p) ↔ (¬𝒞θ P(p) ∧ ¬𝒞θ ¬P(p)))  [Gen, 5]
         ◻
The following corollaries are easily deduced from T12:
T12.1. ∀p (K(p) ↔ ¬(𝒞θ P(p) ∨ 𝒞θ¬P(p)))    ◻
 (For all situations, a situation is contingent iff either it is not the case 
that God wills such situation to be the case or He wills such situ-
ation not to be the case.)
T12.2. ∃p (K(p) ↔ ¬∀p (𝒞θ P(p) ∨ 𝒞θ¬P(p)))   ◻
 (There is a contingent situation iff it is not the case that, for all situ-
ations, either God wills a situation to be the case or He is opposed to 
that.)
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T12.3. ∀p (K(p) ↔ (¬𝒞θ P(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)))    ◻
 (For all situations, a situation is contingent iff either it is not the case 
that God wills such situation to be the case or He permits such situ-
ation not to be the case.)
Now, we proceed to prove that at least one contingent situation exists. In order 
to do this, we use the following theorem:
T13. ¬∀p (𝒞θ α(p) ∨ 𝒞θ¬α(p))
 (Not all situations are such that either God wills a state of affairs or 
its opposite.)
Proof. 
  1. ∀p (𝒞θ α(p) ∨ 𝒞θ ¬α(p)) [Hip]
  2. 𝒞θ α(p) ∨ 𝒞θ ¬α(p)  [1, Spec]
  3. ¬𝒞θ α(p) → 𝒞θ ¬α(p)  [PC, 2]
  4. 𝒞θ ¬α(p) → ¬α(p)  [T1.3, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
  5. ¬𝒞θ α(p) → ¬α(p)  [PC, 3, 4]
  6. α(p) → 𝒞θ α(p)   [PC, 5]
  7. ∀p (α(p) → 𝒞θ α(p))  [Gen, 6]
  8. ∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [7, α(p)/P(p)]
  9. ¬∀p (P(p) → 𝒞θ P(p))  [T2]
10. ¬∀p (𝒞θ α(p) ∨ 𝒞θ ¬α(p)) [¬Hip, 1]
        ◻
T14.  ∃p K(p)
 (There is at least one situation that is contingent.)
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Proof.
1. ∃p (K(p) ↔ ¬∀p (𝒞θ P(p) ∨ 𝒞θ ¬P(p))) [T12.2]
2. ¬∀p (𝒞θ P(p) ∨ 𝒞θ¬P(p))   [T13, α(p)/P(p)]
3. ∃p K(p)    [PC, 1, 2]
        ◻
T15.  ∀p ((ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)) → K(p))
 (For all situations, if a situation is evil, and God permits it, then such 
situation is contingent.)
Proof. 
  1. ¬∀p ((ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)) → K(p))  [Hip]
  2. ∃p ¬((ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)) → K(p))  [FOL, 1]29
  3. ¬((ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)) → K(p))  [FOL, 2]
  4. (ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)) ∧ ¬K(p)  [PC, 3]
  5. ¬K(p)    [PC, 4]
  6. ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)    [PC, 4]
  7. ξ(p)     [PC, 6]
  8. 𝒟θ P(p)    [PC, 6]
  9. ξ(p) → ¬𝒞θ P(p)   [T6, Spec]
10. ¬𝒞θ P(p)    [MP, 7, 9]
11. ¬𝒞θ P(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)   [PC, 10, 8]
12. K(p) ↔ (¬𝒞θ P(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p))  [T12.3, Spec] 
13. K(p)     [PC, 12, 11] 
14. ¬¬∀p ((ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)) → K(p))  [¬Hip, 5, 13]
29 We use FOL to indicate the use of some theorems or results from the First-Order Logic.
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15. ∀p ((ξ(p) ∧ 𝒟θ P(p)) → K(p))  [Gen, 15] 
         ◻
Theorem T15 is equivalent to ∀p ((ξ(p) ∧ ¬𝒞θ¬P(p)) → K(p)). It means, there-
fore, that if there is evil in the world and God seems to not will the opposite, then 
this very situation is contingent and thus does not depend on his good will. In 
conjunction with the refutation of DET1 and DET2, these theorems explain how 
the existence of evil can be consistent with the attributes of God. The answer is 
quite simple: as determinism fails (T4 and T5), if there is evil in the world, God 
does not will such an evil to be the case (T6), but if He permits evil, then it must 
be contingent (T15).
Finally, we present a semantics for N3.
2.5. Semantics of N3
As usual, the model for the system N3 is a structure ⟨W, R, D, V⟩, where W  is 
a set of possible worlds; R ⊆ W2 is a relation of accessibility; D is the domain of 
objects; and V: WFF×W  →  {0,1} is a function of valuation, where ϕ, ψ ∈ WFF and 
w, w′ ∈ W, determined by an assignment µ, such that, for each variable p of LN3, 
µ(p) ∈ D. In particular, the valuations for the modal operators 𝒲θ and 𝒞θ are 
given by the following conditions:
(i) V(𝒲θ ϕ, w) = 1 iff V(ϕ, w) = 1
(ii) If V(𝒞θ ϕ, w) = 1 then V(ϕ, w′) = 1 for every w′ ∈ W such that wRw′.
Let W  =  {w0, w1, …, wn, …}, where n ∈ N, be a set of possible worlds, R = W2, 
and D = ℕ ∪ {-1}, and for every assignment µ we fix that µ(θ) = 0. The function 
of valuation V is such that:
V(B) = {(0, wn): n ∈ ℕ};
V(ξ) = {(-1, wn): n ∈ ℕ};
V(P) = V(B) ∪ V(ξ) ∪ {(2n, wn): n ∈ ℕ};
V(δ) = V(P) – V(ξ).
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We proceed to show that 𝔐 = ⟨W, R, D, V⟩, thus defining a model for the 
axioms of N3. It is worth noting that this model does not explicitly distinguish 
objects from situations. Furthermore, we can say that an object p satisfies a predi-
cate Pi in a possible world w iff (µ(p), w) ∈ V(Pi).
Let us begin with axioms A2 and A3, because we use A2 to show A1.
[A2:] 𝔐 ⊨ ∀p (δ(p) → ¬ξ(p)) 
Proof. Since V(δ) = V(P) – V(ξ), then, V(δ) ∩ V(ξ) = ∅. Thus, for every p, 
it is not the case that (µ(p), w) ∈ V(δ) and (µ(p), w) ∈ V(ξ). Thus, 
for every p, it is not the case that V(δ(p), w) = 1 and V(ξ(p), w) 
= 1. Then, by De Morgan’s law, we have that, for every p, V(δ(p), 
w) = 0 or V(ξ(p), w) = 0. Therefore, for every p, V(δ(p), w) = 0 or 
V(¬ξ(p), w) = 1. So, for every p, V(δ(p) → ¬ξ(p), w) = 1. It follows that 
V(∀p (δ(p) → ¬ξ(p)), w) = 1. ◻
[A3:]  𝔐 ⊨ ¬∀p (P(p) → δ(p))
Proof.  We have that V(¬∀p (P(p) → δ(p)), w) = 1 iff V(∀p (P(p) → δ(p)), w) 
= 0. The latter is the case, iff there is an object p, such that V(P(p), w) 
= 1 and V(δ(p), w) = 0. We have that (-1, w) ∈ V(ξ) ∩ V(P), because 
(-1, wn) ∈ V(ξ), for every n ∈ N, and V(ξ) ⊂ V(P). Thus, since V and µ 
are well-defined functions, there is an object p in the domain, such 
that µ(p) = -1. Therefore, we have an object p, such that (µ(p), w) ∈ 
V(P) and (µ(p), w) ∈ V(ξ). Since V(δ) ∩ V(ξ) = ∅, so we have that 
(µ(p), w) ∈ V(P) and (µ(p), w) ∉ V(δ). But this implies that V(P(p), w) 
= 1 and V(δ(p), w) = 0. Therefore, V(¬∀p(P(p) → δ(p), w) = 1. ◻
Now, let us consider A1. Since B(θ) is obtained through a conjunction, that 
is, WW ∧ NM ∧ WM ∧ DB, it is enough to show that its constituent formulas are 
true according to the interpretation considered:
[A1:] 𝔐 ⊨ WW ∧ NM 
Proof. WW ∧ NM is equivalent to ∀p (α(p) ↔ 𝒲θ α(p)). By the condition (i) 
above, we have that, for every p, V(𝒲θ α(p), w) = 1 iff V(α(p), w) = 1. 
Therefore, we have that V(∀p (α(p) ↔ 𝒲θ α(p)), w) = 1. Therefore, 
WW ∧ NM is true in 𝔐. ◻
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𝔐 ⊨ WM
Proof. By definition, WM is equivalent to ∀p (𝒞θ α(p) → α(p)). By the con-
dition (ii) above, we have that if V(𝒞θ α(p), w) = 1 then V(α(p), w) 
= 1, since R is reflexive, and, consequently, wRw. Thus, V(∀p (𝒞θ 
α(p) → α(p)), w) = 1. Therefore, WM is true in 𝔐. ◻
𝔐 ⊨ DB
Proof. The only restriction to assignments µ in 𝔐 is that µ(θ) = 0, since θ is 
the only distinguished object in N3. Therefore, we can consider two 
assignments, µi and µj, and a pair of objects, p and q, with p ≠ q ≠ θ, 
such that 
(µi(p), wm) ∉ V(P) and (µi(q), wm) ∈ V(ξ); and
(µj(q), wm) ∉ V(P) and (µj(p), wm) ∉ V(ξ); 
for some m, n ∈ ℕ, and m ≠ n.
But that means that
(*) V(P(p), wm) = 0 and V(ξ(q), wm) = 1; and
(**) V(P(q), wn) = 0 and V(ξ(p), wn) = 1;
for some m, n ∈ ℕ, and m ≠ n.
Now, let us suppose that an r exists such that V(𝒞θ P(r), w) = 1 but 
V(δ(r), w) = 0. Then, from A3, we have that V(𝒞θ P(r), w) = 1 and V(ξ(r), 
w) = 1. So, from condition (ii), we have that (***) V(P(r), w′) = 1 for 
every w′ ∈ W, and V(ξ(r), w) = 1. But, if we took p = r and wn = w in 
(*) and (**), we would have that V(P(r), wn) = 0 and V(ξ(r), w) = 1, for 
some m ∈ N, contradicting (***). Thus, V(∀p (𝒞θ P(p) → δ(p)), w) = 1. 
Therefore, DB is true in 𝔐. ◻
Thereby, we concluded that 𝔐 ⊨ B(θ), and, therefore, 𝔐 is a model for N3.
The meta-theory is assumed to be consistent. Thus, when we give a model (in 
this case, a set-theoretical model) for theory N3, we conclude that it is also con-
sistent. Otherwise, if it were possible to derive a contradiction in N3, it would 
imply that there would be a contradiction in the model. That is, the consistency 
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of N3 is conditioned by the consistency of the meta-theory and/or, in this case, 
also by the consistency of the set theory. Thus, from the fact that ¬DET1 and 
¬DET2 are theorems of N3 it is reasonable to conclude that DET1 and DET2 are 
not theorems of N3.
Final Remarks
In this article, we described a first-order modal system called N3, a system which 
aims at dealing with religious determinism and the logical problem of evil. On 
the one hand, if the results are correct, then we have an answer to these questions, 
now stated in formal terms with clarity and precision. On the other hand, N3 es-
tablishes its results with many fewer assumptions than N1, N2, or those original 
systems developed by Nieznański,30 and in a widely recognized formal language. 
Both outcomes, together, provide a narrower response to the logical problem of 
evil through the refutation of determinism, possibly offering a new pathway to 
the solution of this debate.
For all that has been shown, the results provide a characterization of many 
issues involving the logical problem of evil. Furthermore, in conjunction, they 
provide a  framework for reconsidering whether there is compatibility between 
the existence of evil and the existence of God. We hope that it deals satisfactorily 
with the allegation of religious determinism; we think that such results provide 
a detailed approach that must not be ignored, as they provide a relevant response 
to such difficult questions. At least, for those involved in the mainstream discus-
sion, even if the solutions available do not fulfil their pretension, there is one 
more solution at hand, which tackles the question in an innovative way, and with 
tools that may be more precise than those of just natural language.
Finally, as we remarked in the Introduction, we believe that the usage of for-
mal systems may provide several advantages in solving philosophical and theo-
logical problems. “Standing on the shoulders” of Bocheński, of the Cracow Cir-
cle, and of Nieznański as well, we think that our approach can be considered 
30 We recognize that, despite affirming that the goal of his systems was to deal with the problem of 
evil, Nieznański had much more in mind than just dealing with this question. In his systems, he 
deals with God’s will and a number of dispositions (permission, opposition, causality, responsi-
bility), exhibiting a full-blown treatment of these “divine properties.”
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an example of logic of religion, and, as such, we hope that it contributes to the 
advancement of the field. 
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Summary
Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems to deal with the problem of 
evil and to refute religious determinism. However, when formalized in first-or-
der modal logic, two axioms of each system contradict one another, revealing 
that there is an underlying minimal set of axioms enough to settle the questions. 
In this article, we develop this minimal system, called N3, which is based on 
Nieznański’s contribution. The purpose of N3 is to solve the logical problem of 
evil through the defeat of a version of religious determinism. On the one hand, 
these questions are also addressed by Nieznański’s systems, but, on the other 
hand, they are obtained in N3 with fewer assumptions. Our approach can be con-
sidered a case of logic of religion, that is, of logic applied to religious discourse, 
as proposed by Józef Maria Bocheński; in this particular case, it is a discourse in 
theodicy, which is situated in the context of the philosophy of religion.
Key words: logical problem of evil, theodicy, first-order modal logic, logic of re-
ligion, Edward Nieznański
